


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3 December 1965

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Communist-initiated incidents in South Vietnam reached a record high last week, sustaining the accelerated pace of the past few weeks. A number of unusual developments suggest that additional deployments of regular North Vietnamese Army units may be under way. Asian Communist propaganda capitalized heavily on last week's protest demonstrations in the US against policy in Vietnam. Hanoi appears to be seeking new bloc commitments of economic assistance to counter the effects of US bombings.	
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Asia-Africa

INDONESIAN ARMY PRESSES ANTI-COMMUNIST DRIVE

8

Communist Party branches are being dissolved piecemeal and rank and file party members slaughtered in some areas.

MORE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY AID FOR CAMBODIA

9

Peking has agreed to increase its military aid commitments, while the Soviet military assistance program in Cambodia is at a standstill, probably due to Moscow's vexation with Phnom Penh's pro-Chinese attitude.

SCATTERED FIGHTING CONTINUES IN LAOS

10

The Communists have lost some positions near Thakhek in central Laos and northwest of Luang Prabang, but are exerting pressure in other areas.

ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, AND PALESTINE "LIBERATION" ACTIVITIES

The Arab states have differing policies toward the organizations dedicated to the "liberation" of Palestine. Jordan, the haven for most of the Palestine Arab refugees, keeps a damper on both their political and terrorist activities because it is the Arab state most susceptible to Israeli reprisals and is vulnerable to Nasirite subversion among the Palestinians. Syria, far less exposed to Israeli retaliation, encourages the Palestinian refugee raids into Israel. Egypt is cautious in supporting the Arab-Palestine cause because a wrong move could, with little warning, provoke the worst Arab-Israeli confrontation since the Suez conflict. (Published separately as Special Report OCI No. 0317/65A)

CONGO QUIET AFTER MOBUTU TAKE-OVER

12

Congolese politics seem headed for a period of relative calm following the coup on 25 November, but difficulties may arise from civilian and military political jockeying.

DAHOMY REGIME OVERTURNED

13

When a political stalemate seemed threatened, the army ousted the country's two top officials and installed a provisional regime.

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BRITISH POLICY ON RHODESIA TOUGHENING

14

London is imposing stricter economic sanctions, sending air force units to Zambia, and threatening to use force to protect the Kariba dam. Inside Rhodesia, only isolated incidents of violence have occurred.

Europe

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FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER PRESSURE TO LIBERALIZE

13

The party congress next month may produce a fight that could cost the Communists votes in next year's national elections.

Western Hemisphere

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BRITISH GUIANA TO BECOME INDEPENDENT NEXT MAY

20

Premier Burnham and his coalition partner seem to have reached substantial agreement on constitutional provisions, and chances appear to be declining that opposition leader Cheddi Jagan will rouse his followers to effective violence against the Burnham government.

RESULTS OF THE OAS CONFERENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO

20

The foreign ministers approved resolutions calling for study of political and economic measures to amend the OAS charter and strengthen the inter-American system.

GENERAL STRIKE FAILS IN PANAMA

21

Determined action by President Marco Robles prevented Communist and opposition elements from exploiting a 72-hour general strike which began on 23 November.

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- DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POSITION GROWING STRONGER 22
Despite agitation and plotting by politicians on the left and right, Garcia Godoy's position appears stronger than at any time since he took office in September.
- SIGNIFICANCE OF RAUL CASTRO'S VISIT TO USSR 23
The deference accorded the younger Castro reflects the importance Moscow attaches to good relations with Cuba. The Castro delegation probably concentrated on military and political subjects during its lengthy stay in the USSR.
- FRICTION AMONG BRAZIL'S LEADERS 24
A serious rift seems to be developing between President Castello Branco and War Minister Costa e Silva, who has long been a mediating influence between the President and his critics among the military hard-liners.

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VIETNAM

Communist-initiated incidents in South Vietnam last week reached a record high, sustaining the accelerated pace of Viet Cong activity during the past few weeks. One of the most damaging large-scale actions of the war occurred on 27 November, when a Viet Cong force of at least regimental strength launched a dawn attack on the Vietnamese 7th Regiment in Binh Duong Province. Although the 7th had beaten off an attack in the same area five days before, enemy forces this time achieved complete surprise, overran two battalions, and inflicted 600-700 casualties in four hours of severe fighting. Allied reinforcements searching the area afterward failed to make contact with the enemy force. The Viet Cong also attacked several government outposts and positions in the coastal provinces of I and II Corps.

Incidents of terrorism, also at record levels last week, were concentrated in government-controlled areas in the delta region and near Saigon where seven hamlet chiefs and one district official have been killed in the past three months.

US military officials have confirmed two new Viet Cong regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province and list a probable additional

enemy regiment near Saigon. Confirmed enemy regiments in South Vietnam now number 18, including seven North Vietnamese regiments. Confirmed enemy strength now totals 68,000 main force troops. In addition there are some 39,000 political cadres, 17,000 combat support troops, and over 100,000 guerrillas.

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Exploitation of Protests in US

The Asian Communists capitalized heavily on last week's protest demonstrations in the US against policy in Vietnam. The principal Vietnamese Communist moves were a special message from Ho Chi Minh to the protest leaders, and the Viet Cong's release of the two long-captive US soldiers who subsequently told the press in Cambodia of their desire to "tell the American people the truth about Vietnam." Peking characterized the protests as "quite different" from past peace campaigns because they did not stop at demanding peace in general terms but clearly directed their "fire at the US ruling circle's policies of aggression and war." The Chinese may see the protest movement as an important element in US policy considerations in the long term. Over the short run, they probably hope the protests will serve to bolster Vietnamese Communist morale in the face of the US buildup.

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The need for this kind of support was illustrated by the defensive tone of a South Vietnamese Liberation Radio broadcast of 20 November. The broadcast lashed out at unidentified critics of the Vietnamese Communist decision to continue fighting, accusing those who advocate negotiating unconditionally

DRV Air Defenses

Three more surface-to-air missile sites have been found in North Vietnam, bringing the total number to 52. Sites 50 and 51 are located about 25 miles west-northwest of Hanoi and one is apparently still under construction. The 52nd site is located eight miles northeast of Thanh Hoa. None of the three sites contained missiles or missile-associated equipment.

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with the US of being "lackeys of the US in the Tito style, of betraying the revolution, their nation and Marxism-Leninism." Although this broadcast may have been aimed at foreign Communist critics, it may also have been a remonstrance to some Vietnamese Communists who have lost confidence in Viet Cong military prospects.

Hanoi's Economic Mission

For the second time in five months, the DRV has dispatched high-ranking economic specialist Le Thanh Nghi to Peking, Moscow, and Pyongyang. Nghi's return to both Moscow and Peking in such a short time suggests that important or difficult economic problems may be under negotiation. However, Hanoi may be seeking additional supplies of capital equipment for bomb damage repair and perhaps even food, clothing,

and other necessities whose production may have been disrupted by the bombings. Hanoi may also believe it essential to get some long range commitment on future bloc assistance in the event that US bombings destroy most of North Vietnam's industry and transportation system.

Hanoi Hosts Canadian Communists

Canadian Communist Party president Tim Buck is presently heading a delegation to Hanoi. This is the third free world Communist party delegation to Hanoi this year and appears to be part of an effort by the North Vietnamese to elicit more vigorous support. The Canadians were received by Ho Chi Minh and have conducted talks with party First Secretary Le Duan.

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The Communist World

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION

Recent developments suggest that the compromises reached in September which enabled the Soviet regime to move ahead with industrial reorganization did not entail any real stabilization of the political situation. In particular, the question of where the dividing line lies between party and government authority--and, by extension, between that of Brezhnev and Kosygin--clearly was not settled.

Political maneuvering, seen chiefly in personnel shifts, has continued and apparently has centered on the party-government is-

sue. An important issue at any time, it is given a special urgency by the approach of the 23rd Party Congress, set for 29 March 1966. Thus far the party seems to be ahead.

Only a week after the Supreme Soviet had reorganized the government and amended the constitution, 18 members were dropped from the Council of Ministers, leaving 65, exclusive of the 15 republic premiers who seldom attend council meetings. In the process, four of the eleven state committees whose chairmen, by the

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amended constitution, were automatically members of the council were dropped from that status. In mid-November Mikhail Yefremov was added to the council as a deputy premier.

These changes so soon after the Supreme Soviet met clearly indicate continuing political strife. Yefremov is a party professional without previous government experience. His appointment is indicative of the party's tactics of infiltrating the government to ensure a strong party role in economic administration.

One of the clearest statements of the party's claims to jurisdiction in the new system is an Armenian party decree giving the republic's party organizations the task of selecting personnel for the newly formed republic executive agencies. Concrete evidence of party incursions into the government sphere is the large number of party professionals who have recently been given government posts: in the republics, one premier, one first deputy premier, 4 deputy premiers, and 17 ministers; in the USSR Council of Ministers, one deputy premier, one minister, and two deputy ministers (all high party officials). The promotion of Dmitry Polyansky to first deputy premier perhaps should also be added since he too, although most recently serving the party as a deputy premier, has

made his career as a party professional.

In other respects the reorganization has been carried out more or less as expected. The republics have completed theirs--at least on paper--and staffing of the new agencies is well advanced. The republic party organizations, responding to the convening of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, have set dates for their congresses (see box).

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FORTHCOMING REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES IN USSR

REPUBLIC	DATE OF CONGRESS
Armenia	3 March 1966
Azerbaijan	24 February 1966
Belorussia	3 March 1966
Estonia	1 March 1966
Georgia	2 March 1966
Kazakhstan	10 March 1966
Kirgizia	3 March 1966
Latvia	2 March 1966
Lithuania	3 March 1966
Moldavia	1 March 1966
Russia	*
Tadzhikistan	2 March 1966
Turkmenia	24 February 1966
Ukraine	15 March 1966
Uzbekistan	3 March 1966

*Unlike the other republics, the Russian (RSFSR) does not have its own party organization and therefore does not hold a republic party congress.

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MOSCOW'S CALIBRATED RESPONSE TO CHINESE POLEMICAL ATTACK

Confronted with Communist China's stepped-up anti-Soviet campaign, Moscow has been relatively restrained in its public reaction. This tactic, however, has not prevented the Soviet leaders from responding forcefully to a particularly galling Chinese affront, especially when they considered Peking vulnerable.

Such was the case on 28 November when Pravda, in a lengthy editorial, attempted to exploit the 11 November Peking People's Daily - Red Flag polemic. Reflecting Soviet satisfaction at the setbacks the Chinese have suffered in their world-wide policies, Pravda set out to demonstrate that China's obstructionist tactics have isolated it from the "overwhelming majority" of revolutionary forces which have endorsed Moscow's call for united action against the "common enemy, imperialism."

The Soviet response reflects, in part, concern lest continued silence be interpreted as a sign of weakness or an admission of guilt. It is, however, even more indicative of Moscow's view that Peking's open refusal to cooperate with the USSR in defense of Vietnam has played into Soviet hands.

Pravda continues to appeal for joint action, even though it has long since become obvious that there is little possibility of coordinating either aid or policies in support of Hanoi. Moscow's tactic has been designed to draw a rejection from Peking and thus lay the blame for

intrabloc difficulties squarely on the Chinese. Not until China's most recent full-scale polemic, however, have the Soviets been able to point to an open admission by Peking of its adamant stand.

The Pravda editorial does not refer specifically to the People's Daily - Red Flag tirade, nor does it attempt to counter or refute all the Chinese charges. The target is clear, however, particularly when Pravda condemns the "line of political and organizational division, of splitting the Communist movement now counterposed to the clearcut position of Marxist-Leninist parties which advocate unity of action." The editorial lays special stress on the serious harm to the Vietnamese Communists caused by "this splitting."

Apart from these refinements, Pravda covered familiar ground in comparatively nonpolemical fashion, and generally reflected the satisfaction with which Khrushchev's successors view the gains achieved by their more subtle approach to bloc affairs. Despite the recent Chinese challenge to "carry on public polemics," the Soviets will probably continue to avoid the heated, tit-for-tat acrimony reminiscent of the Khrushchev era, but will speak out when the occasion demands, as they now have done several times over the past year.

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COMMUNIST CHINA PUTS POLITICAL PRESSURE ON SCIENTISTS

The Peking regime is demanding more political subservience from physicists and other natural scientists. Although the leadership has always insisted that all intellectuals be "red" as well as "expert," it put relatively little pressure on natural scientists for several years after the Soviets withdrew their technical experts in 1960.

In January 1965, however, the authoritative theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, Red Flag, lashed out at natural scientists with a demand that they, like everybody else, consider the "class struggle" their foremost task. On 4 June 1965, People's Daily published an article signed by Chien Hsuehsen, US-trained rocket specialist, apologizing for having belittled politics in the past. He warned that scientists must not consider themselves an elite group, but must humbly study and apply Mao's ideas.

Since last summer Red Flag has published several articles exhorting scientists to spend more time reading Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary political tracts and to use his ideas, buttressed by dialectical materialism, to guide their research work. Publication of the series in Red Flag suggests that a major policy decision on this issue was made at the highest level.

The Red Flag articles, exuding typical Chinese arrogance, attack several prominent Western scientists--including Niels Bohr,

Werner Heisenberg, and Linus Pauling--for alleged philosophical failings. Red Flag charges that Bohr's Copenhagen school of theoretical physics mislead the world of physics for 40 years by failing to adopt a dialectical approach. This criticism is significant because the Bohr Institute--center of the Copenhagen school--has been giving postdoctoral training to two junior Chinese Communist nuclear physicists since 1963.

Red Flag had high praise for one foreigner, a Japanese named Sakata, whose work on subatomic particles allegedly proves the universal validity of Mao Tse-tung's thesis that "one always splits into two." This previously had been applied only in a political context, to justify Chinese efforts to split the international Communist movement and to support divisive revolutionary activities abroad.

The recent Red Flag articles indicate that henceforth Chinese scientists will be expected to use political as well as scientific criteria to determine the suitability of Western scientific theories. The effects of this policy cannot yet be judged, but it could ultimately have an impact comparable to Lysenkoism, which hampered science in the USSR for many years. The damage done in China will depend on the extent to which scientists are allowed to continue their serious work while merely giving lip service to political shibboleths.

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PEKING OUTBURST AT BOURGUIBA REFLECTS HARDER POLICY LINE

Peking recently lashed out at Tunisian President Bourguiba for his outspoken criticism of China's leaders in an interview with the French journal Realitiés. Bourguiba had apparently referred to Peking's "limitless pretensions." A sharply worded diplomatic protest on 19 November was followed by an editorial in People's Daily the following day which took Bourguiba to task for "railing at China" whenever he wants US aid.

The Chinese Communists had never before attacked by name the leader of an African country with which they maintain diplomatic relations. Their annoyance in this instance was probably due mainly to Tunisia's decision to abstain this year on the Chinese representation

vote in the UN. The Tunisians had voted in favor of seating Communist China in 1963.

Although the bitter Chinese outburst may presage a further deterioration in the no-more-than-correct relations between the two countries, a complete break is probably not imminent. The Chinese are undoubtedly loath to reduce their diplomatic presence in Africa. In the last year only one additional African country recognized China. On the other hand, recent Chinese foreign policy moves have shown signs of growing inflexibility and doctrinal fanaticism. The Chinese now are certainly less solicitous of the feelings of African moderates and even tend to ignore those of many of the more radical Africans.

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Asia-Africa

INDONESIAN ARMY PRESSES ANTI-COMMUNIST DRIVE

The Indonesian Army continues to put pressure on President Sukarno and to push its attack on the Communist Party (PKI). Although the army clearly has the upper hand over the Communists, the power struggle with Sukarno remains unresolved.

Sukarno has dismissed air force chief Dani, a prime target of the army for his role in October's abortive coup. Although Dani retains his cabinet post, his discharge is a virtual admission by Sukarno of Dani's complicity. Several prominent left-wing politicians, previously under Sukarno's protection, are apparently under detention. Foreign Minister Subandrio, another army target, has publicly accused the PKI of masterminding the uprising, a reversal

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of his earlier efforts to play down the party's role.

There are indications that Indonesian political parties hope to exploit the deteriorating economic situation to force cabinet changes on Sukarno. Rice supplies are shrinking and inflation is rampant. Catholic Party leaders, backed by six other parties, are reportedly asking for an emergency inner cabinet to "settle economic problems and stabilize the situation." If Sukarno bows, the army and its allies presumably intend to capitalize on any foreign aid they may obtain in the future to cement their position.

The piecemeal dissolution of the PKI and its affiliates

continues, and there is considerable speculation that Sukarno, who now may have accepted the PKI's demise, will soon issue a formal ban. The army apparently hopes to block party attempts to go underground. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The US Embassy is convinced all but one or two members of the PKI politburo have been captured.

The all-out campaign against rank-and-file party members gives no sign of letting up. However, the army has shown some concern about untrammelled Muslim violence, and is taking steps to curb it. [REDACTED]

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MORE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY AID FOR CAMBODIA

Communist China's position as chief supplier of military equipment to Cambodia has been strengthened by recent new commitments. The Soviet military aid program there is at a standstill, probably due to Moscow's vexation with Phnom Penh's increasing pro-Chinese attitude.

Prince Sihanouk announced on 27 November that the Chinese-

Cambodian military aid agreement concluded in Peking last week includes, for the first time, a small number of conventional and jet aircraft. Cambodia previously had received six jet aircraft from the USSR.

Chinese military aid to Cambodia heretofore has consisted largely of ground forces

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equipment said to be sufficient to equip "27,000 men" and has been valued at about \$4 million. The most recent Chinese delivery to Cambodia, made in June, is believed to have completed shipments under the previous military agreement concluded in late 1964.

Moscow's disillusionment with Phnom Penh has left unde-

livered several jet fighters and some antiaircraft guns. Work continues on a Czech-assisted munitions factory. In the past Prague has also supplied some small arms and ammunition to Cambodia and may be requested, during Sihanouk's planned visit to Eastern Europe, to furnish additional military materiel not available in China. [REDACTED]

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SCATTERED FIGHTING CONTINUES IN LAOS

Fighting continues in widely separated areas of Laos although no major Communist attacks have been reported in the past week.

In the Thakhek area in central Laos, reinforced government forces have regained several positions lost to the Communists in early November and now are mounting cautious sweeps to the east along Route 12 and south along Route 13. The Communists have withdrawn from one position straddling Route 13 some ten miles southeast of Thakhek. However, reports indicating that substantial numbers of Communist troops moved west on Route 12 in mid-November suggest that renewed Communist pressure in the Thakhek area may be in the offing.

The Communists have increased pressure against government positions south of Muong


Phalane. Several companies of friendly troops withdrew on 28 November from positions along the Se Kum Kam river to fall-back positions around Ban Nong Boualao, a key defensive position. Reinforcements have been brought in to defend the village.

In northern Laos, friendly guerrillas have recaptured Vieng Pou Kha, some 90 miles northwest of Luang Prabang, which was lost to the Pathet Lao last May. In the Samneua area, light Communist probes over the past two weeks have been rebuffed by friendly forces positioned along Route 6. Roadwatch reports indicating that the Communists are moving large supply convoys south of Samneua town to their advanced positions suggest that some step-up in their efforts to clear Route 6 may be forthcoming. [REDACTED]

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CONGO QUIET AFTER MOBUTU TAKE-OVER

Congolese politics seem headed for a period of relative calm following last week's coup by army chief Mobutu.

Mobutu, who installed himself as President on 25 November, has kept extensive power in his own hands. He has assumed the authority to legislate by decree, and has taken charge of the country's security police. He also holds the defense and information ministries in the cabinet, headed by army Colonel Mulamba, which received parliamentary approval on 27 November.

This is a considerable concentration of authority for one who has never been a brilliant administrator. Moreover, Mobutu will have to spend a good deal of time monitoring the politicians in the cabinet, since Mulamba, although he is one of the few competent officers in the army, has no experience in Leopoldville politics. Their first task is to get the ministers to transcend regional and personal interests--and in this regard Mulamba's appointment of relatives to important positions is an inauspicious first step.

The position of the politicians themselves is still uncertain. Ex-President Kasavubu is at his house in the Leopoldville paracommando camp. He does not seem to be pressing for permission to return to his tribal area west of Leopoldville, and the army

probably would not allow him to leave if he wanted to. Former premier Tshombé apparently is biding his time on the theory that Mobutu will eventually turn to him. In the meantime he is cultivating Mulamba, who has already consulted him several times. Tshombé is said to be thinking of developing an image as the champion of "legality" in the face of the "illegal" army take-over. Several other politicians, including former premier Adoula, are holding aloof from politics.

Ex-Interior Minister Nendaka's status is uncertain. He is included in the government, but in the less important transport ministry. Mulamba distrusts him, and Mobutu in the days before the coup was concerned about his ambition and opportunism. The extent to which he can regain his influence depends on the degree to which Mobutu's proverbial loyalty to long-time associates overcomes his qualms about Nendaka's recent activities.

The coup's long-term significance may turn out to be the immersion of the army in politics. For a few months the country may be carried along on the euphoria attendant on the partial displacement of Leopoldville politics. Later, however, the country may find itself with competing military factions added to the traditional civilian maneuvering.

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DAHOMEY REGIME OVERTURNED

Dahomey's chronic political instability has again produced an abrupt change of regime and a provisional government installed by the country's military leaders. The new system which emerges seems likely to be based, at the insistence of the army, on support from all three of Dahomey's major regions.

Dahomey has a political tradition of depending on a coalition of two of its three principal regional leaders, with the third excluded and often in prison. The roles were rotated periodically. The most recent arrangement, initiated after an army-supported revolt in late 1963, had a dual executive--Sourou-Migan Apithy as president and chief of state and Justin Ahomadegbe as the slightly more powerful vice president and chief of government--and former president Hubert Maga in prison. Virtually from their inauguration, Apithy and Ahomadegbe began intriguing against one another. On 25 November, after releasing Maga and lining up the support of a broad range of organizations, Ahomadegbe launched his attempt to oust Apithy.

Apithy refused to budge from the presidential palace in Porto Novo, the center of his political support, and some popular agitation in his favor ensued. Faced with a developing stalemate, the army stepped in and, after a minimal show of force, secured the resignations of both executives. From that point, the

situation was returned to constitutional procedures and the presidency passed to the president of the National Assembly, Tahirou Congacou, who is favorable to Maga. Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Congacou on 29 November made a joint radio appeal for calm and conditions returned to normal. The provisional government plans to complete a constitutional revision and to hold new presidential elections within 50 days.

Army Chief of Staff Soglo, who is being credited with bringing off this coup, has not yet clarified his own political position. He is believed to have personal ambitions for the presidency. However, the army is itself divided and Soglo seems unwilling to gamble on a move which might lack the support of a majority of the officers.

The apparent popular indifference to the overthrow of the regime indicates that the people of Dahomey are tiring of the constant maneuvering of their leaders. They probably would accept any government, particularly one with high-level representation from all three regions, which showed an inclination to come to grips with the country's serious economic problems. France, which continues to make heavy budgetary contributions to Dahomey, is evidently prepared to support any political settlement that safeguards its own interests in the country. 25X1

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
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BRITISH POLICY ON RHODESIA TOUGHENING

The British Government has shifted to a tougher position on Rhodesia, including a threat to use force to protect the Kariba dam and a decision to impose stricter economic sanctions.

Prime Minister Wilson has announced that the UK "will not stand idly by" if Rhodesia

should cut off power to the Zambian Copperbelt from the Kariba hydroelectric complex on the Rhodesian side of the border. Wilson refused to assure the Tory opposition that British forces would not be sent across the border or British planes into Rhodesian air space if trouble developed at Kariba.



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Wilson also revealed that he had offered Zambia an RAF jet fighter squadron, to be stationed at Ndola in northern Zambia, and RAF ground forces to go to airfields there, at Lusaka, and possibly Livingstone. The move, however, is reportedly contingent on Zambia's promise not to accept military forces from other countries unless the UK agrees. Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley is in Lusaka to discuss Kaunda's reservations, as well as his request for additional British ground forces. The outcome of the talks is not known. RAF units are apparently on the move to Zambia, but negotiations reportedly are continuing on the use of British Army units.

The UK has announced it will ban imports of Rhodesian food, minerals, and metals, in addition to its earlier ban on tobacco and sugar. This will eliminate over 90 percent of UK imports from Rhodesia. Stringent new financial controls forbid nearly all payments, including pensions and dividends, to all residents of Rhodesia. These new measures are unlikely to harm the Rhodesian economy appreciably, but they do strike directly at many white Rhodesians who are dependent on this income. London is still considering selective export controls and an oil embargo, but is not convinced other countries will cooperate enough to make these measures effective. London

also plans soon to dispatch a high-level ministerial mission to Zambia to discuss economic aid in the event of Rhodesian countermeasures.

Kaunda wants British military forces in order to allay rising fears of Rhodesian retaliation among the populace and to counteract radical African pressures for the dispatch of a military force under auspices of the Organization of African Unity. He apparently still hopes to avoid provocative action against the Smith regime and to allow British economic sanctions to take effect. However, British representatives believe that even Kaunda, hitherto the mainstay of African moderates, fully shares the conviction of Zambian militants that Rhodesia must not be permitted to retain its independence.

Zambian militants, strongly entrenched in the cabinet and the ruling political party, advocate a total trade boycott against Rhodesia, unstinting support for paramilitary action by Rhodesian African nationalists, and allowing Zambia to become a staging area for OAU military intervention, despite the risk of reprisals. Wilson has bluntly reminded Kaunda that no available alternative can possibly maintain Zambia's copper production if Rhodesia withholds power, coal, and rail access. The militants, however, insist that a British force in Zambia will deter the Smith regime from

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economic reprisals, and that a British-US airlift and other emergency measures could somehow replace the vital economic links with Rhodesia.

Incidents of sabotage or racial friction within Zambia could at any time trigger drastic action by the Kaunda government. Last week unknown saboteurs dynamited a main power line to the Copperbelt, and a street brawl between whites and members of the Zambian Youth League in Livingstone sparked a wildcat strike by white railway workers.

The apparent UK-Zambia deadlock over troops has strengthened the radicals in the OAU who insist on the need for sending an African force to Zambia. In this atmosphere, the OAU foreign ministers--meeting in extraordinary session on 3 December in Addis Ababa--can hardly avoid coming up with a specific pro-

posal for some variety of military intervention by member states. However, most African leaders realize that their troops are no match for Rhodesia's forces and the purpose of their offer would be to increase pressure on the UK.

In Salisbury, Prime Minister Smith has said he would welcome a token British military force stationed in Zambia as a moderating influence but added that British forces would be fired on if they violated Rhodesian territory.

The reaction of Rhodesia's Africans to independence continues to be limited to apparently isolated incidents or rock throwing and a few minor explosions, mostly in the industrial city of Bulawayo. A strike called by African nationalists has been foiled by employers' threats of dismissals.

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FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER PRESSURE TO LIBERALIZE

The leadership of the Finnish Communist Party (FCP)--one of the last Stalinist holdouts of the West European parties--is under continuing pressure from liberal and intellectual elements to revamp its orthodox Marxism.

As an initial gesture to the liberals and in order to head off a showdown at the 14th party congress from 29 to 31 January, the leadership convened a special meeting of the central committee in October to consider a resolution updating the FCP's position on basic ideological issues. The need for such a step had become apparent as the liberal ferment continued unabated and the party faced the prospect of entering national elections next spring or summer divided and in disarray.

The liberals maintained that the party must declare publicly that it was abandoning violence as a means of achieving power. They apparently had been greatly influenced by the success of the "national" Communist parties in Denmark and Norway, and the popularity of the Swedish Communist Party under its new, liberal leadership.

The "manifesto" which emerged from the October meeting, however, represented little more than a gesture to the liberals. It stopped short of a clear rejection of violence, explaining that the party "believed" that it could achieve power by legal and democratic means but could not "guarantee that this will be so in real life." The resolution went

on to shelve the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" as unsuited to Finnish conditions and, instead, declared the expression "labor regime" more appropriate.

These half-hearted gestures are not likely to satisfy the liberals, who now may not accept anything less than the removal of such symbols of Stalinism as Chairman Aaltonen and Secretary General Pessi. In their efforts to secure more far-reaching reforms, the liberals are undoubtedly encouraged by the evident sympathy of some Soviet party officials who have hinted that changes in the FCP are overdue.

The congress next month may therefore produce a fight that could have an important effect on the party's fortunes in the national elections. In the 1962 elections the Communists received more than one fifth of the popular vote and won almost one fourth of the seats in parliament. A sharp electoral setback for the FCP would most directly benefit the Social Democrats and bring about a major shift on the Finnish political scene. This would have repercussions on Soviet-Finnish relations in light of Moscow's view that the Social Democratic Party continues to be influenced by anti-Soviet spokesmen. Moscow, however, has been careful to avoid outright condemnation of the party, evidently because of its optimistic election prospects.

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BRITISH GUIANA TO BECOME INDEPENDENT NEXT MAY

British Guiana will receive its independence on 26 May 1966. Under the name "Guyana," the new country will be a constitutional monarchy under the British Queen until at least January 1969, when the National Assembly will probably vote to change it to a republic.

At the independence conference in London from 2 to 19 November, Premier Burnham and his coalition partner, Peter D'Aguiar, were able to reach substantial agreement on constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that agreements reached on paper will enable the two leaders to forget past differences and, overnight, turn themselves into a smoothly running team.

Chances appear to be declining that Cheddi Jagan, leader of the opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP), which boycotted the constitutional talks, will soon rouse his East Indian followers to effective violence against the Burnham government. Some of the PPP's key activists are in prison and others have left the party or been expelled for antiparty activity. Although riots such as those of last year cannot be ruled out, many of the East Indians now seem inclined to put violent political protest aside and get down to the more practical business of making a living.

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RESULTS OF THE OAS CONFERENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO

At the conference of active OAS members (except Venezuela), held in Rio from 17 to 30 November, the foreign ministers approved resolutions calling for study of political and economic measures to amend the OAS charter and strengthen the inter-American system.

The resolutions, styled "Act of Rio de Janeiro," comprise guidelines for a "special preparatory committee" to meet next February in Panama. This is to draft charter amendments for consideration by another foreign

ministers' conference scheduled for July in Buenos Aires. Approved amendments would then be subject to ratification by the individual governments.

The conference produced relatively little public dissension. The only direct criticism of US intervention in the Dominican Republic was a Colombian resolution, which was side-tracked. Disagreement centered on enlarging the OAS Council's function with regard to the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The section

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of the "Act" recommending expansion was favored by a narrow majority, including the US, over the opposition of such countries as Peru, which fears this provision might be used by Ecuador to air in the OAS Council its long-standing objection to the 1942 protocol governing their boundaries. Private conversations were held on the idea of a permanent inter-American peace force, but no formal motion was presented.

The guidelines endorse the principle of an annual inter-

American conference. In the economic sphere, they recommend that the principles of the Alliance for Progress be made a juridically binding part of the OAS charter. The economic resolutions also call for greater cooperation in trade and a Latin American common market. The conference endorsed the modification of the OAS structure to include three councils directly responsible to the Inter-American Conference: Economic- 25X1 Social, Cultural-Scientific, and Political. The matter of their location was left open. [redacted]

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GENERAL STRIKE FAILS IN PANAMA

Determined action by President Marco Robles prevented Communist and opposition elements from exploiting a 72-hour general strike which began in Panama on 23 November.

A union of public employees dissatisfied with the government's offer of a \$4.5-million wage increase in the face of their demands for raises amounting to about \$20 million, called the strike despite lack of popular sympathy. Commercial activity was nearly normal in Panama City, although roving bands of students and teachers, supporting the strike, tried to disrupt traffic and force merchants to close down. Communist leaders, searching for some means of provoking a government crisis, had directed the student groups to take to the streets.

National Guard units, using only tear gas and batons, effectively dispersed the demonstrators on 23 and 24 November, arresting over 300 in Panama City and Colon. Security forces also surrounded the University of Panama and a secondary school where relatively small bands of armed students had barricaded themselves and were hurling gasoline-filled bottles and rocks onto adjacent streets.

Officials had feared that former president Arnulfo Arias would call on his supporters to join the disorders in order to topple the government. However, Arias apparently saw that the strike was foredoomed and merely published a manifesto which supported its objectives. 25X1 [redacted]

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DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POSITION GROWING STRONGER

Despite agitation and plotting in the Dominican Republic by politicians on the left and right, Provisional President Garcia Godoy's position appears stronger than at any time since he took office in September.

The President's relations with his military chiefs--once a prime source of governmental instability and an impediment to the restoration of public order--have improved at least temporarily, to the relief of those Dominicans eager to set about repairing the economic dislocation caused by the recent strife. The military chiefs' support in the face of a right-wing conspiracy on 22 November did much to remove the President's doubts about their loyalty. For his part, the President finally has begun the long-promised transfer of some of the more controversial leftists to overseas posts. Former attorney general Morel Cerda was the first to go, becoming ambassador to Uruguay. The military now seem willing to give him additional time to effect other reforms they have been demanding.

Garcia Godoy is trying to make the most of his improved position. He hopes to solve the problem of military integration by taking about 420 former rebel officers and men back into the armed forces and buying off the remaining 700. He also is trying to complete the member-

ship of an electoral commission, and has set 1 June as election day.

Divisive issues remain, however, and there is no lack of Dominicans eager to exploit them. It appears likely that the "political truce"--designed to reduce tensions during the first six months of the provisional government--will be observed in name only. Joaquin Balaguer's Reformist Party (PR) already has launched its well-prepared campaign. Other parties--for the moment unable to match the PR's effort, largely because of factional disputes--are jockeying for position and alliances. Juan Bosch's tactics seem largely defensive, as he and his followers eagerly carry rumors of right-wing plotting to the President. The US Embassy speculates that Bosch is moved both by concern for his personal safety and by a desire to undermine the growing rapprochement between Garcia Godoy and the military.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF RAUL CASTRO'S VISIT TO USSR

Raul Castro's recent visit to the USSR was a further step toward closer Soviet-Cuban relations. The younger Castro's visit, which began in early October, included lengthy conversations with top Soviet political and military figures, observation of the Warsaw Pact "October Storm" exercise, talks with East German and Czech officials, and seating in the place of honor at the Soviet Revolution Day ceremonies. Castro, who is both armed forces minister and deputy premier, was accompanied by Cuban party and governmental personnel as well as military officials.

Although the only formal agreement announced covered "economic and technological cooperation," a wide range of topics undoubtedly was discussed and an arrangement for continued Soviet military aid was probably worked out. An exchange of economic delegations earlier this year, leading to an agreement in September for large new aid for the Cuban sugar industry, suggests that the Castro delegation concentrated on military and political subjects.

Soviet military deliveries to Cuba have declined steadily since 1962.

The importance Soviet leaders attach to Cuba was also highlighted by Foreign Minister Gromyko's 19-24 October visit to Havana. The USSR is evidently satisfied with the degree to which Fidel Castro has moderated his policies toward both the US and the Latin American continent.

Soviet leaders have almost certainly counseled the Cubans to adopt a more flexible approach in their relations with the US and have urged Castro to follow a more cautious policy in supporting militant, insurgent groups in Latin America. According to the UK ambassador in Havana, Gromyko emphasized the necessity for Castro to probe those areas where some limited agreements with the US might be reached. Moscow probably hopes that if Cuba continues to pursue this course, the US will find it increasingly difficult to maintain its political and economic isolation of the island.

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FRICITION AMONG BRAZIL'S LEADERS

25X1 A serious rift seems to be developing in Brazil between President Castello Branco and War Minister Costa e Silva, who has long been a mediating influence between the President and his critics among the military hard-liners. [REDACTED]

25X1 The war minister apparently feels there is undue interference by Magalhaes in military matters. Costa e Silva's wife reportedly has commented that there no longer is mutual confidence between her husband and the President.

Costa e Silva probably is irritated by the lack of enthusiasm for his presidential ambitions within the administration. He is known to be interested in becoming the candidate of the revolution to succeed Castello Branco in the 1966 presidential election.

The reports of friction among the regime's top leaders coincide with increasingly open

criticism of the President by hard-line military officers. This attitude was highlighted this week by a public protest letter signed by hard-line leader Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Boaventura Cavalcanti, who has been placed under arrest for publishing it. The letter reflected the hard-liners' bitter resentment of Castello Branco's unwillingness to bar Governor-elect Negrão de Lima of Guanabara from taking office on 5 December. [REDACTED]

25X1 Castello Branco is continuing to shuffle army commands, replacing troublesome hard-liners with his supporters. The new First Army commander, for example, is General Adalberto Pereira dos Santos, who is considered a forceful disciplinarian and "non-political" officer. However, a definite break with Costa e Silva would greatly impair the administration's ability to maintain control over the military. [REDACTED]

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
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SPECIAL REPORT

ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, AND PALESTINE "LIBERATION" ACTIVITIES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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GROUP 1: Excluded from automatic
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ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, AND PALESTINE "LIBERATION" ACTIVITIES

The frustrations of more than a million Arab refugees from Israel are leading to new efforts, both peaceful and violent, dedicated to the "liberation" of Palestine. Formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization is the latest of several attempts to provide a political focus for the refugees, and it has the nominal backing of the Arab League. At the same time, however, two independent terrorist groups seem to be trying to trigger incidents which would bring the Arab states into military action against Israel.

Jordanian King Husayn opposes either approach to eliminating Israeli rule because his country is the Arab state most exposed to any Israeli reprisal. Moreover, Jordan includes part of Palestine and is the haven for half of the refugees, and Husayn is wary of pro-Nasir subversion among Jordan's Palestinians. Syria, on the other hand, whose support of the terrorism offers greater provocation to the Israelis, enjoys the advantage of being more difficult to retaliate against.

Although Nasir, like Husayn, seems anxious to avoid any escalation of the sporadic border incidents, these Palestine-Arab activities could, with little advance notice, lead to the largest Arab-Israeli clashes since Suez.

The Refugee Problem

Israel's victory in its 1948-49 war of independence left more than 700,000 Arabs homeless. Two thirds of them encamped in the part of Britain's Palestine mandate that was later attached to the kingdom of Jordan, and the remainder were assembled in the Egyptian-occupied Gaza strip and in Syria and Lebanon. In 17 years, with the addition of children born in exile, their number has grown to 1,280,000, according to UN figures.

While a large majority of the refugees still live in camps, some have taken jobs elsewhere in the Arab states and have been at least partially integrated into the local life of their host countries. This slow process, together with the passage of time and the lesser resentment of younger refugees who have no strong attachment to the former homes of their parents, has tended to reduce "liberation" pressure. As a matter of principle, however, the refugees continue to adhere to the 1948 UN

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
resolution which acknowledges their right either to return to their homes or to obtain compensation. Their position is supported by the refugees' host governments, partly as a tactic against Israel but probably also because they are re-

luctant to assume full responsibility for the fate of the refugees.

The refugees exert continuing pressure on all the host governments concerned but have the profoundest impact in Jordan. Half of that country's population of 1,875,000 lives on the west bank of the Jordan River in what was formerly Palestine, and 688,000 out of the total are refugees whose sustenance has come mainly from UN relief funds. Lacking employment and frustrated by their inability to oust Israel, their misfortune is a source of constant unrest, and they tend to look to any figure of strength who offers the greatest promise of a return. Their resentment makes many of them susceptible to proposals for radical action.

Through much of the past decade the Palestinians have looked to Nasir as their potential savior. The Egyptian President's efforts to quiet Arab passions on the Palestine question during the past two years has provided a new source of frustration, and the activists now tend to look to Syria for their inspiration and support.

The problem for Jordan's rulers from the beginning has been to maintain control of these troublesome people against all comers, while at the same time to keep up Jordan's anti-Israel credentials with its Arab neighbors. This has resulted in repeated clashes with those who would organize the Palestinians as a people only temporarily removed from their homeland, and with a national identity of their



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own. King Abdullah's formal annexation of the West Bank in 1950 dramatized his hostility to those promoting this Palestine nationhood concept.

Early Palestine Arab Efforts

The oldest effort to organize Palestine Arabs, the "All-Palestine Government" of the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, is moribund from neglect. Formed during the war with Israel and located in Gaza, it gained recognition from all Arab governments other than Jordan. Nasir, however, became disillusioned with this movement and ceased supporting it a few years ago. From his present headquarters in Lebanon Hajj Amin still claims to represent all of Palestine's Arabs, but his once-major role has been assumed by others.

During the next five years a succession of new proposals for a Palestine "entity" were advanced, but got nowhere. They foundered on the rivalries between Nasir and other Arab leaders, especially Iraq's Qasim. Husayn adamantly opposed all such schemes, but in 1960 felt obliged to announce that he would hold a plebiscite on Jordan's West Bank "if necessary." He probably believed that the majority would vote for separation from Jordan, and managed to stall on implementing the offer.

The PLO

In the uncommon atmosphere of cooperation at the first Arab summit meeting in January 1964, however, a proposal for a govern-

ment that omitted any reference to the controversial "entity" was accepted by Husayn, as well as the other heads of government. Four months later the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formally launched at a congress held in Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem. Its constitution provided for a national assembly, an executive committee, and an army. The second Arab summit in September 1964 formally approved these decisions, and recognized the PLO as the official representative of all Palestine Arabs. An army commander responsible to the Arab League's United Arab Command was appointed, and \$25 million was allocated to fill almost all of the PLO's budgetary needs.

The PLO's driving force is Ahmad Shuqayri, an energetic and articulate man of about 60 who for many years has been a prominent Arab Palestinian spokesman and who has served on the



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Syrian and Saudi UN delegations. On the PLO's executive committee, which he heads, Shuqayri has brought together representatives from various segments of Palestine society. A PLO "Voice of Palestine" radio station now broadcasts daily from Cairo.

A Palestine Liberation Army of 15,000-25,000 troops is envisaged. About 5,000 are active thus far. Six Egyptian-officered Palestinian battalions in Gaza make up the bulk of these, and the Syrian Army has also made a paper transfer of one commando battalion to the Palestine force. Recruiting and training of additional units for the force apparently have begun in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as in Egypt, Syria, and the Gaza strip.

Shuqayri is seeking to attract worldwide support. A PLO delegation began a three-month promotional tour of Latin America in mid-November. The PLO also plans to send representatives to Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Peking, Belgrade, New Delhi, Djakarta, and other capitals.

So far Communist China has shown the most interest in the PLO. Last March Shuqayri led a 12-man delegation to Peking where the group met Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai and was offered arms aid and training facilities. Since the visit, Peking radio has broadcast periodic statements in support of the cause of Palestine "liberation."

PLO Problems

The PLO is encountering some of the same problems that

beset previous efforts to galvanize the Palestinians. In addition, Shuqayri's flamboyant and aggressive personality has antagonized many people. Dissension within the executive committee has resulted in resignations which have already brought one reorganization.

Shuqayri has had only limited success in supplementing the Arab League's subsidy. He says he has secured Iraq's and Kuwait's agreement to deduct for the PLO 3 to 5 percent from the salaries of the many Palestinians employed by their governments, but there is no confirmation that such payments are being made. A Shuqayri proposal to raise funds for the PLO by imposing a one-percent tax on every barrel of oil produced in the Arab states has not been accepted.

As with earlier ventures, Nasir is the PLO's principal patron, apparently because he wants to protect his own interest in any such organization and also because he sees it as a potential instrument for influencing politics in Jordan and other Arab states. There are signs he is less than enthusiastic about Shuqayri's freewheeling leadership, and seems to be trying to secure closer control over the PLO. At the same time Syria's ruling Baath party is trying to penetrate the PLO to prevent its domination by Nasir. According to the Jordanians, the Syrian Government has offered Shuqayri the use of its radio and press facilities to attack Egypt, Jordan, and any other Arab state which is not sufficiently aggressive on the Palestine question.

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He has not yet taken up this offer.

For all its international backing and dynamic leadership, the PLO does not seem to have gained the loyalty of great numbers of the people it purports to represent. The US Embassy in Amman reports that the general feeling among the Palestinian refugees and other West Bank Arabs appears to be that the PLO is going nowhere and is not worthy of serious consideration unless it produces better results. The embassy believes that unless Nasir gives it more support, it has little chance of becoming strong.

Jordan and the PLO

Whatever its inherent strength or weakness, the PLO provides a major source of irritation in Jordan.

Despite his current friendliness with Nasir, King Husayn recognizes the potential threat to his regime posed by the PLO and Nasir's influence in it. He appealed to Nasir to end the PLO radio's attacks on him from Cairo, and Nasir apparently obliged since the propaganda battle has subsided. Husayn has refused to permit the recruitment or formation of separate Palestinian units in his country, and has also rejected PLO requests to station troops in Jordan to reinforce border villages against Israeli raids. He has noted that Palestinians in Jordan serve in the Jordanian Army, thus eliminating any need to form separate units. His gov-

ernment has expressed willingness only to accept financial aid and arms to bolster Jordanian defenses.

Yet Jordan is sensitive to Nasir's pressures in the name of the PLO. The recent Jordanian decision to form six new infantry battalions was made in part to resist the PLO's bid to station units of its own along the Jordanian-Israeli border. The raids mounted from Jordan by the terrorist organization "Fatah" this year pose a pressing security problem for Husayn, who fears that Jordanian weakness in the face of Israeli reprisals would also give substance to the PLO's claims that reinforcement is necessary.

The Fatah

The Fatah--an Arabic acronym for "Palestine liberation movement"--apparently was formed as early as 1958 by Palestinians who had become disgusted and discouraged with the inaction of Arab governments on behalf of the Palestinian cause. It is small, and tightly organized into cells, with headquarters variously reported as being in Damascus, Beirut, and Kuwait. The organization's paramilitary arm--called "Asifah," meaning "storm"--recruits its members from among a few hundred professional infiltrators and smugglers who have operated across Israel's borders for many years. Some formerly served Egypt as fedayeen commandos before the Sinai war of 1956.

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Most of Fatah's financial support comes from wealthy Palestinians now living in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A Fatah delegation was scheduled to leave for Latin America in late November to seek funds from the sizable Arab emigré communities there. Local governmental support has come principally from Syria, which provides training facilities and a propaganda outlet. Fatah reportedly has had some contacts with the Chinese Communists, who offered training in guerrilla warfare.

Fatah's sabotage activities began only last January. The Israelis claim it has been responsible for about forty raids into Israel, mainly involving sabotage of buildings, waterworks, and irrigation facilities. Some of these missions have resulted in severe injuries to Israelis but as yet apparently no fatalities have occurred.

Almost all have been launched from Jordanian territory; the remainder have originated in Lebanon. Fatah's objective may be to force an Arab showdown with Israel by provoking Israeli retaliation.

The Israelis know that neither the Jordanian nor Lebanese government approves of these raids, and that neither wants any trouble with Israel. The Eshkol government, however,

is critical of their failure to stop the raids and contends that border inhabitants of those countries have cooperated with the terrorists. Twice Israel struck back against suspected terrorist bases in Jordan--on 28-29 May and 5 September--and once against a base in Lebanon--on 29 October--to give emphasis to its view.

In recent weeks reports have been received about the formation of another organization which intends to conduct sabotage raids into Israel. Called the "Palestine Liberation Front," it appears to be based in Syria like Fatah but allegedly does not have the support of either the Syrian Government or the Baath Party. This group, too, is said to be disappointed in the reluctance of Arab governments to take meaningful action against Israel, but it also is critical of what it considers Fatah's ineptness and mere "noise making."

Fatah's Implications

For the moment, however, Fatah is the group that is worrying Nasir as well as Husayn for its troublemaking potential. The Nasir-backed PLO initially opposed the Fatah's raids for this reason. More recently, however, the two organizations reportedly have arranged contact in order to take cooperative action. Nasir is said to have encouraged

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these contacts. He probably wants to achieve some influence over Fatah in order to keep it from creating a situation which might draw Egypt into a confrontation with Israel.

Further Israeli reprisals against Fatah bases in Jordan might at any time cause Husayn to take drastic action to undercut charges of weakness against Israel. He might be goaded into striking back across the border, despite the inherent dangers in such a move. On the other hand suppression of the terrorists could prompt them to turn against his regime, and attempt to assassinate Jordanian leaders. (Husayn's grandfather fell to a Palestinian assassin's bullet 14 years ago.) Lebanon faces similar problems on a lesser scale.

Israel, too, may feel impelled to take more drastic action if the new Liberation Front begins operations and Fatah continues its raids. This could involve a strike against more heavily defended Syria despite the remoteness from the border of suspected Fatah training centers. Some Israeli press comment has suggested such a step.

In contrast to the relatively open Lebanese and Jordanian frontiers, the short Syrian border and the rough terrain favors the Arab defenders. Any Israeli reprisal operation into Syria would therefore have to be larger in scope than those against Jordan and Lebanon, with correspondingly greater danger of touching off a broader conflict. 25X1

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